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Abstract t
A Theil's entropy index utilizing premiums written as units is employed to
measure trends in concentration of the largest 200 property-casualty companies in the United States between 1985 and 1993 based on Best's Insurance
Report data. Each of the indexes confirms that concentration trends experienced no increase for the whole period for all 200 firms, the top 20, and subsets of lower ranked companies. Significant differences are observed, however,
between groups of companies for the same period.
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1

Introduction

Throughout its history the United States economy has experienced
cycles of mergers and acquisitions. The most recent cycle, according
to Shleifer and Vishny (1991) and Sikora (1995), occurred during the
1980s. Significant factors contributing to mergers and acquisitions
in the 1980s included laxity in antitrust enforcement policies and improvements in takeover technology (such as leveraged buyouts and junk
bonds).
The property and casualty insurance industry was not exempt from
this merger wave. Farinella (1996) reports that between 1985 and 1995
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some 660 corporate retirements, acquisitions, and mergers occurred in
response to what Gart (1994) describes as tremendous changes within
the insurance industry. Increasing competition drives the change and
forces more company mergers, creating conglomerates of multiple function companies. Multiple functions allow a company to take advantage
of the opportunities in the emerging financial services field. Such activities may lead insurance companies to engage in anticompetitive practices, resulting in allegations of collusion, restriction of output, and
favorable terms from consumers. Anticompetitive practice may cause
the repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act which exempts insurance companies from federal antitrust enforcements.
Roughly 3,000 companies constitute the property-liability insurance
industry. Due to numerous affiliations, however, there are really only
800 independent decision-making units or groups. In 1993, according to Huebner, Black, and Webb (1996), the net premiums written, the
combined admitted assets, and policyholders' surplus totaled $253.8
billion, $571.5 billion, and $182.3 billion, respectively. Policyholders'
surplus serves as a cushion so that larger-than-expected losses can be
paid. The abundance of cash, access to cheap capital, and low interest rates helped boost the recent trend in mergers and acquisitions
(Farinella 1996).
There are two major conflicting arguments regarding mergers. One,
according to Gilbert (1989), is that mergers enhance efficiency by promoting consumer welfare through a superior allocation of productive,
financial, and managerial resources. Potential competition serves as a
control on monopoly power. Salop (1987) and Adams and Brock (1996)
note that the rationale for this argument is provided by economists at
the University of Chicago. Simply stated, this theory focuses on consumer welfare as the sole concern. The other argument, supported by
economists at Harvard University, is that mergers damage the overall
working of the economy, lessen competition, and increase concentration of sales and thereby create monopoly power in a given industry.
The process of concentration is defined as the increase in the extent
economic activity is controlled by large firms.
Clarke (1985) distinguishes market and aggregate concentration and
absolute and relative concentration. Market concentration concerns a
specific industry under the control of a few large firms which may lead
to the exercise of monopoly power. Aggregate concentration occurs
when a few large firms control broad segments of the economy (such as
manufacturing, financial, and insurance sectors) or when the power of
conglomerates extend beyond a particular industry. Changes in aggregate concentration may signal a change in the distribution of economic,
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political, or social power. Another distinction is between relative and
absolute concentration. If all firms grow the same proportion, concentration increases absolutely but relatively remains the same. Relative
concentration is concerned with the share of output held by large firms
among a fixed number of firms. Accordingly, various indexes are proposed to measure such concentrations.
The most widely used indexes are the k-firms concentration ratio,
whereby the share of sales of the k largest firms (out of a total of n
firms) are combined; the Herfindahl, defined as the sum of the shares
of all n firms with the share of each firm weighted by itself; the Gini,
which measures the extent to which firms in the industry are unequal
in size; the coefficient of variation, which is the ratio of the standard
deviation to the mean; and the Theil's entropy, l which is used in physics
as a measure of disorder. Hannah and Kay (1977) find Theil's entropy
to be one of the most satisfactory indexes. As a result, Theil's entropy
is used throughout this paper as the measure of concentration.

2

Past Studies

In the two decades spanning 1973 to 1991 three studies provide excellent information on the structure of the property insurance industry.
The common denominator of these articles is an assessment of market concentration by product line category or by ownership category.
Joskow (1973) informs us that the 1206 property-liability insurance
firms as a whole in 1971 held assets of $ 68 billion and premiums of $ 35
billion. Over half of the latter was written by the top 20 firms, resulting
in a slight increase in concentration since 1961. Joskow also examines
concentration within two individual lines, automobile and fire. Again,
the top 20 firms accounted for concentration levels of approximately
56 percent in each line, increasing from 45 percent for automobile and
from 49 percent for fire in 1954. Joskow believes that as a result of
effective competition, consumers moved their business from high cost
firms to low cost firms and thereby caused concentration to increase.
1 Entropy in used in information theory a measure of disorder. In the field of economics, entropy is conveniently translated as a measure of the concentration of firms
in an industry. Sawyer (1981, pp. 29) explains that this use of entropy in economics
is justified along the lines that an industry will be more competitive the greater the
uncertainty as to which of a given number of firms will secure the business of a buyer
chosen at random, and entropy is a measure of this uncertainty. Note that a rise in entropy indicates an increase in competitiveness and hence a decrease in concentration.
Brockett (1991), Brockett and Song (1995), and references therein provide examples of
other applications of information theory to actuarial science.
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Mayers and Smith (1988) use geographical concentration, line-ofbusiness concentration, and specialization as indicators of success for
the ownership type structure (Uoyds, common stock, mutual, reciprocal) of the insurance companies. Mayers and Smith find stock companies are less concentrated geographically than the other three forms
of ownership. When not controlling for size, mutual companies were
the least concentrated by line of business. When controlling for size,
however, reciprocals were the most concentrated.
The third significant paper, by Cummins and Weiss (1991), assesses
concentration for the personal and commercial categories for four, ten,
and 50 largest firms. They discover that for the personal lines in 1989
the top four firms controlled 43.2 percent and 41.8 percent of private
passenger auto liability and private passenger auto physical damage,
respectively. For homeowners, 39.5 percent was controlled by the top
four firms. On the commercial side, 26.7 percent of workers' compensation was controlled by the top four firms. Cummins and Weiss echo
the assessment of Joskow that concentration in some insurance lines
results from the efficiency advantage some companies have in dealing with clients and from gains in market share that accompany lower
prices for insureds.

3 Aim and Purpose
Most studies on concentration of property insurance have been based
on a product line category or on ownership category, the two important classifications according to Gart (1984). Due to the two interrelated categories, the noticeable reorganization of the insurance industry where there is increased interest in financial services, and general
corporate mergers, many insurance companies operate on many lines
and thus have become conglomerates. Specifically, mergers among
competing firms, who already occupy substantial positions as pointed
out by Manne (1965), are viewed with suspicion.
Utton (1970) explains that where overall (aggregate) concentration
exists, it is most likely that some individual markets will be highly concentrated. There are also arguments that stress the significance of aggregate concentration. Among these arguments is the notion that when
a large proportion of economic activity is held by a relatively few firms,
it constitutes a threat to democratic government directly through pressure groups and indirectly through advertising. A follow-up to this
notion is the concern that basic policy decisions such as future investment, price, and product poliCies (which are functions associated with
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entrepreneurship) are made by a small number of individuals, perhaps
one or two members of the board of directors. Furthermore, large diversified firms can affect the market conduct even though their relative
shares do not constitute a monopoly. If one large firm has a stronger
position in a specific product line and another firm has a stronger position in another line, it is unlikely that any of the firms compete in the
market where it has the advantage for fear of retaliation in the market
where its position is not strongly established. The focus of attention,
therefore, is the overall concentration of economic power controlled by
a small number of large firms, typically the largest 100 or 200 enterprises.
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the effects of reorganization and mergers of recent years on aggregate concentration. Such an
assessment will add further insight into the structure of the propertycasualty insurance industry with data from Best's Insurance Reports on
the largest 200 American property casualty companies. Similar studies concerned with aggregate concentration in the industrial sector have
been conducted using the Fortune 500, a popular source of data for such
studies. Notable among these are the works by Hexter and Snow (1970),
Nissan and Caveny (1985, 1988), Attaran and Saghafi (1988), Saghafi
and Attaran (1990), and Deutsch and Silber (1995). The data supplied by
Best's Insurance Reports since 1985, whereby the 200 largest American
property-casualty companies are ranked, provide a similar opportunity
for measuring aggregate concentration for the insurance industry.

4

Measurement

Using the data on shares of premiums reported in Best's Insurance
Reports for the largest 200 firms or groups in 1985, 1989, and 1993,
Theil's entropy is used to quantify the degree of concentration. The
three periods 1985, 1989, and 1993 are spaced in time to show if any
significant changes occurred. Between 1985 and 1989 approximately
250 mergers and acquisitions occurred. Between 1990 and 1993 approximately 300 occurred. The question is whether these mergers have
resulted in an increase in concentration.
Theil's (1967) entropy, E, is defined as
n

E=-LPilogpi,O:::;E:::;logn

(1)

i=l

where Pi 2': 0 is the i-th firm's proportional share of premiums; n is the
number of firms, and :L. Pi = 1.
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If all n firms have an equal share, then E = log n, and concentration
is at a minimum, in contrast to E = 0 when one firm controls all shares.
Therefore, a decline in E corresponds to an increase in concentration.
For a given level of entropy E*, the numbers eqUivalent, (n *), is the
number of equally sized firms it would take to produce the same level
of entropy E*, i.e.,
n* = eE *.
(2)

5 Empirical Results
The largest 200 property-casualty insurance companies or groups of
companies accounted in 1993 for 73 percent of net premiums written
($189 billion of $259 billion), 78 percent of admitted assets ($ 527 billion
of $672 billion), and 84 percent of holders' surplus ($153 billion of $182
billion). These huge sums indicate that this comparably small number
of firms held a significant control of the market.
The three panels of Table 1 report for 1985, 1989, and 1993 the total net premiums, the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum, the
maximum, and the coefficient of variation. The information in Table 1
is supplied for the largest 200 companies as well as by smaller sets of
four groups of companies 001-020; 021-050; 051-100; 101-200. Total
net premiums written by the 200 companies increased from approximately $117 billion in 1985 to $189 billion in 1993, an increase of 62
percent. The largest 20 companies accounted on average for 50 percent
of total premiums written throughout the period, followed by the next
30 companies of lesser rank accounting for approximately 20 percent.
The lesser ranked sets of 50 companies and 100 companies, ranked 51
to 100 and 101 to 200, accounted for approximately 16 percent and 15
percent, respectively.
In 1993 the average net premiums written for all the 200 companies
reached almost $1 billion, with the largest 20 companies writing on
average $4.7 billion. The smallest company among the 200 in 1993
wrote $200 million worth of premiums, while the largest wrote well over
$22 billion. For all 200 companies the coefficient of variation shows an
increase from 1.81 in 1985 to 2.01 in 1989 to 2.18 in 1993. For the
respective three periods the most noticeable increase in the coefficient
of variation occurred for the top 20 companies, moving from 0.80 to
0.94 to 1.12. The coefficient of variation for the other groups remained
virtually the same throughout the three periods.
Table 2 shows the results for the computation of the concentration
index, the Theil's entropy E of equation (1). There are slight changes
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Table 1
Summary Information of Net Premiums Written
of Largest Property.Casualty Companies

Com~anies

Total
Panel A: 1985
All 200
117,103
001-020
56,840
021-050
23,460
051-100
19,005
101-200
17,798
Panel B: 1989
All 200
166,645
001-020
83,380
021-050
32,706
051-100
27,010
101-200
23,549

Coefficient
Standard
of
Percent Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Variation
100
49
20
16
15

586
2,842
782
380
178

1,058
2,281
183
79
46

114
1,228
547
265
114

10,331
10,331
1,201
540
264

1.81
0.80
0.23
0.21
0.26

100
50
20
16
14

1,677
833
4,169 3,920
1,090 272
540
118
236
54

148
1,664
770
350
148

16,873
16,873
1,657
757
348

2.01
0.94
0.25
0.22
0.23

Panel C: 1993
All 200
189,030 100
945 2,060
200
22,226
2.18
001-020
93,100
49 4,655 5,202
1,982
22,226
1.12
021-050
36,735
20 1,225 264
879
1,882
0.22
16
425
051-100
30,730
615
853
0.23
139
101-200
28,465
15
200
285
423
60
0.21
Source: Best's Insurance Reports: Property-Casualty United States (Oldwick,
New Jersey: A.M. Best Company, 1985, 1989, and 1993) and calculations by
the author. Total, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum are in $
millions.

in the magnitudes of E over time among the 200 companies, as well
as the smaller subsets of 20, 30, 50, and 100 companies. This is also
obvious from the numbers equivalent n * of equation (2). The numbers
equivalent for all the 200 firms was reduced from 99 in 1985 to 92 in
1989 to 91 in 1993. For the top 20 the sequence is 16, 15, 14. Hardly
any change is visible for the lower ranked companies.
Next we need to ascertain whether these apparent differences in
entropy over time are statistically significant. Let Eij denote the entropy
associated with the proportion of premiums (Pij) written for firm i in
time period j, be denoted by
Eij = - Pij

log Pij

(3)
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Table 2
Concentration of Premiums Written
of Largest Property·Casualty Companies

Numbers
ComQanies
Panel A: 1985
All 200
001-020
021-050
051-100
101-200
Panel B: 1989
All 200
001-020
021-050
051-100
101-200

Theil's Entr0I2Y (E} Standard Deviation

EQuivalent

1.9976
1.2022
1.4661
1.6901
1.9859

.0112
.0265
.0079
.0052
.0040

99
16
29
49
97

1.9661
1.1720
1.4646
1.6890
1.9887

.0119
.0293
.0084
.0055
.0036

92
15
29
49
97

Panel C: 1993
.0119
All 200
1.9594
91
001-020
.0317
14
1.1333
021-050
1.4678
.0073
29
051-100
1.6881
.0057
49
101-200
.0033
1.9908
98
Source: Best's Insurance Reports: Property-Casualty United States (Oldwick,
New Jersey: A.M. Best Company, 1985, 1989, and 1993) and calculaLions from
equation (1).

for i = 1,2, ... , n, j = 1985,1986, ... ,1993 and
equation (1), it is obvious that

2:r=l Pi}

=

1. From

n

E.j =

L Eij = nE.j.
i=l

To test the hypothesis of equality of a pair of total entropies E.j
and E.k. for j, k = 1985, 1989 and 1993, the appropriate test statistic
(assuming that a large sample approximation is appropriate) is
Z

=

E.j - E.k

~n(sJ + Sf)
where

(4)
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Under the null hypothesis, the statistic Z has a standard normal distribution.
The results indicate that differences in total entropy are not statistically significant at (){ = 0.05, in which case IZI < 1.96. None of
the computed IZI values for the groups of companies 20, 30, 50, and
100 exceeds 1.96. The important conclusion from these results is that
the levels of concentration among these groups remained virtually the
same throughout the period 1985-1993. In other words, no substantial shares of premiums written were transferred from one company to
another.
The picture looks a bit different when the comparisons are made
between the groups at each period. Note in Table 1 that E increases in
magnitude, indicating a decrease in concentration as one moves down
the hierarchy from the top 20 companies to the bottom 100 companies
for every period, thus pointing to the existence of larger concentration
among the top 20 than among the next 30. In turn, there is more concentration among this group of 30 than among the smaller group of 50
companies, which has higher concentration than the next group of the
smaller 100 companies. The patterns, however, remain the same for
every period. Concentration does exist, especially among the largest
firms, yet the level of concentration has remained stable.
The reorganization and mergers of recent years have not resulted in
a perceptible increase in concentration in the property-liability insurance industry, unlike what has happened in other services such as retail
trade, electric and utilities, and the transportation sectors, as shown by
O'Neill (1996). These services experienced large increases in concentration in recent years.

6

Summary

This paper focuses on measuring aggregate concentration using as
units net premiums written of the 200 largest property casualty companies, an important sector in the U.S. economy. Theil's entropy index
is employed for the period 1985 to 1993. The index is not sensitive
to measuring an increase in concentration among the 200 companies
or by groups of 20,30, 50, and 100 companies. Concentration between
these groups of companies remained stable for every period under consideration. During the period under consideration which was marked
by a substantial activity of mergers and takeovers the property-liability
insurance industry cannot be accused of increasing its overall economic
power in spite of the large number of mergers.
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The findings that no perceptible increase is detected in aggregate
concentration in the property-liability insurance industry do not preclude the possibility that some lines of insurance have become concentrated as a result of recent mergers and acquisitions. Tests at the
aggregate level may mask increasing trends in concentration on a byline basis. Past studies were conducted using data prior to 1990. Because mergers and acquisitions have been relatively high in the past five
years, documenting changes in by-line concentration since 1989 would
be useful.
The debate whether industry concentration is due to growth of efficient firms that manage to maintain low cost operations through economies of scale or whether concentration is due to collusion and suppression of competition continues. In the mean time, efforts must be made
to provide empirical evidence as to whether concentration exists and,
if so, whether it is increasing or decreasing over time.
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